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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE RE-
STRICTIONS OF THE CORPOR-
ATE LIMITS OF THE CITY OF 
BINGHAM CANYON, UTAH. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Civil No. 
10456 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought by Petitioners Kennecott 
Copper Corporation and The Anaconda Company, seeking 
the disconnection of certain property from the city limits 
of the City of Bingham Canyon, State of Utah, which ac-
tion is brought pursuant to Utah Code Ann., Section 10-4-1 
(Rep. Vol.1962). 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Trial Court, Judge Stewart M. Hanson presiding, 
granted the prayer of Petitioners in full and ordered the 
restriction of the limits of the City of Bingham Canyon, 
2 
State of Utah, as prayed, upon a finding that justice and 
equity so required. 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellant, City of Bingham Canyon, seeks to have 
the decree restricting the limits of the city reversed and 
the application of Petitioners dismissed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Beginning in 1959, at the behest of property owners 
within the City of Bingham Canyon, the Petitioner, Kenne-
cott Copper Corporation, embarked upon a program of pur-
chasing property from property owners of that city (R. 
32). Sales by the property owners were made willingly, 
without coercion, and at fair prices (R. 98). At the time 
of these various sales, assurances were made by Kennecott 
to the sellers of the property that future purchases would 
be undertaken for prices proportionate to those involved 
in the executed sales (R. 41). As a result of this purchas-
ing program, all of the property within the original Bing-
ham Canyon City limits has been purchased by Kennecott 
with the exception of 14 parcels, all of which remain within 
the limits of said city after disconnection (R. 34). In total, 
Kennecott has purchased 207 parcels of property at a total 
cost of $3,621,860.00, including the approximate sum of 
$180,000.00 for demolition of buildings on the properties 
purchased (R. 60). 
The property sought to be disconnected is owned ex-
clusively by the Petitioners, Kennecott and Anaconda. The 
a 
original area of the City of Bingham Canyon was approxi-
mately :32-1 acres (R. 53). The petition here involved 
sought to disconnect approximately 90% of this area leav-
ing approximately 30 acres within the restricted limits of 
the City of Bingham Canyon (R. 53). In the area to be 
disconnected, there are no inhabited dwellings whatsoever 
(R. 14). Moreover, the owner of the disconnected property, 
Kennecott, has stated that it has no plans for future use of 
said property for residential or commercial purposes (R. 
58). The <lisconnected property will be used only by the 
petitioners in pursuit of mining operations (R. 59). 
Of the 30 acres remaining within the restricted city 
limits, there are 14 parcels of property owned by residents 
of Bingham Canyon and others (R. 34). The remainder 
of this 30 acres, (over 90 % thereof) is owned by Kennecott 
Copper Corporation (R. 63) (Ex. P. 2). Kennecott plans 
no residential or commercial use of its properties within 
the restricted city limits (R. 34). 
There has been a marked decrease in the population of 
the City of Bingham Canyon from a total of 3200 people· in 
1930, to 2834 in 1940, 2569 in 1950, and 1516 in 1960 (R. 
14). The present population of the City of Bingham Can-
yon is 7 4 people, including two or three transients (R. 50). 
Of the 7 4 residents, only 7 are employed at the Bingham 
Canyon pit, owned and operated by Kennecott Copper Cor-
poration, out of a total employment at the mine of 2757 
workers during the month of June, 1965 (R. 63-64). Ken-
necott Copper Corporation does not depend upon either the 
4 
City of Bingham Canyon or its residents for a labor force 
for the operation of the mine (R. 17). 
A portion of the property sought to be disconnecteo 
is actually a part of the open pit mine (R. 58). Naturally, 
Petitioners wish to continue to use said property for mining 
purposes (R. 58). In addition, other portions of the area 
to be disconnected are the sites for developmental drilling 
holes, which are used by the Petitioners in formulating fu. 
ture mining plans (R. 61). The mining usage of such prop-
erty has been hampered and impeded by virtue of zoning 
ordinances, construction permits, and other Bingham City 
legal requirements (R. 61-62). In one instance, an action 
was instituted by the City of Bingham Canyon against 
Petitioner Kennecott and its contractor seeking to enjoin 
them from drilling and mining within a section of Bingham 
City (R. 61). 
The City of Bingham Canyon has surplus funds in its 
treasury which, at the present time, amount to approxi· 
mately $98,000.00 ( R. 94-95). The budget of Bingham City, 
for the fiscal year 1965-1966, is approximately $29,000.00 
(R. 94). By virtue of the City's surplus and the fact that it 
receives sufficient funds from other tax sources, the City 
of Bingham Canyon resolved that no property tax would be 
levied against city property for the taxable year of 1965 (R. 
84). Mayor Dimas, for the City, stated that the City could 
continue to run for several years without tax revenue by 
virtue of the surplus, barring some unforeseen emergency 
(R. 95). The budget for the City of Bingham Canyon has 
declined substantially over the last two years, (R .94), and 
It 
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111 1·t !wr decreases may be anticipated as the population con-
t i11ucs to dwindle. 
\\'ith mrn01· exceptions, to be noted hereinafter, the 
Cit.\· of Bingham Canyon does not extend municipal bene-
fit:-; or sen:ices to the area sought to be disconnected (R. 
J.i). The cvi<lence is undisputed that Kennecott Copper 
Corporation maintains duplicate facilities for virtually all 
services rendered by the City of Bingham Canyon (R. 55). 
Thus, Kennecott Copper Corporation does not desire to use 
Cit.\· services with the sole exception of the sewer system, 
which consists of a cement flume into which Bingham 
Creek flows and into which the residents of Bingham empty 
their sewage ( R. 15, 56). The sewer, which has no disposal 
plant, ( R. 56) was originally built in the early years of the 
1 !l:iO's as a WP A project by the City of Bingham Canyon 
with financial assistance from Kennecott Copper Corpora-
tion (R. 15, 56). Kennecott has been partially responsible 
for the maintenance of this sewer in the past and will con-
tinue to maintain it after disconnection (R. 64). 
The Petitioner, Kennecott, and the City of Bingham 
Canyon presently have a "joint" arrangement with regard 
to culinary water (R. 57). By virtue of a mutual agree-
ment between the City and Kennecott, the latter supplies a 
percentage of water to the City. A spokesman for Kenne-
cott stated that this arrangement could continue unchanged 
after the disconnection (R. 57). However, if the City 
should refuse or prefer not to furnish its share of these 
facilities, Petitioner, Kennecott, could provide its own 
culinary water with the addition of a few pipelines (R. 
6 
57). As things presently stand, however, culinary water 
is not so much a service rendered by the City of Bingham 
Canyon to the area to be disconnected, but the result of a 
mutual agreement between the City and the Petitioner (R. 
57). 
With respect to other services traditionally offered 
by a city to its residents, the undisputed testimony is to 
the effect that such services are not needed, required, or 
usable by the Petitioner in the area to be disconnected. In 
this regard, Mr. J. P. O'Keefe, General Manager of Utah 
Copper Division, Kennecott Copper Corporation, stated 
that, with regard to the property to be disonnected: 
"We have no need for and we do not want and 
there is no way we can possibly use any of the city 
services" ( R. 35) . 
To the extent that the few remaining buildings upon 
the disconnected area require certain services, the Peti-
tioner is able and prefers to provide said services for itself. 
Chief Engineer Thuli testified as follows in this regard: 
"Question: (By Mr. Evans) And will you ex-
plain whether or not the Kennecott Copper Cor-
poration is in need or desires to have any of the 
services which are ordinarily furnished by the City? 
"Answer: (By Mr. Thuli) No. We have almost 
100% duplication service for all of our areas and 
industrial sections; and, therefore, we don't need 
the services offered by the City of Bingham nor do 
we desire them" ( R. 55) . 
With regard to police protection, the City of Bingham 
does provide a policeman who controls traffic within the 
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city limits (R. 81). As concerns the protection of prop-
erty and other security matters, however, the Petitioner 
maintains its own security force which, with the occasional 
use of the County Sheriff, is sufficient for its needs (R. 
57). 
With regard to fire protection, although the Bingham 
City fire department has responded on occasion to fires in 
the surrounding area, Mayor Dimas of Bingham conceded 
that the protection had been inadequate (R. 93). More-
over, the Petitioner maintains its own fire protection force, 
its own volunteer firemen, and fire protective sprinklers 
in its buildings (R. 58). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
JUSTICE AND EQUITY REQUIRE THE RE-
STRICTION OF THE CITY LIMITS OF BING-
HAM CANYON. 
Respondents would agree with the initial proposition 
that Utah Code Ann., Section 10-4-2 (Rep. Vol. 1962) pre-
sents only one basic criterion as a prerequisite to the re-
striction of municipal limits: 
"That justice and equity require that such ter-
ritory or any part thereof should be disconnected 
from such city or town." 
An examination of the Utah cases on the question of munic-
ipal disconnection suggests that there is no set definition of 
"justice and equity" which can be applied with facility in 
8 
every case. Ho\vever, there are numerous factual ingred-
ients which reappear in virtually all of the Utah cases. 
Thus, "justice and equity" have come to acquire a somewhat 
specific meaning within the context of municipal sever-
ance, which meaning may be elicited from an analysis of 
the facts of the several Utah cases in point. 
The following subpoints constitute an analysis of the 
various facets typically involved in the Utah municipal 
severance decisions. Such analysis can ultimately compel 
only one conclusion: That justice and equity require the 
restriction of the corporate limits of Bingham Canyon City 
as prayed by the Petitioner and as granted by the trial 
court. 
A. The alleged loss of tax revenues is neither factu-
ally nor legally sufficient to preclude restriction of corpor-
ate limits. 
Shed of surplusage, the case for the Objector can be 
stated as follows: 
The City of Bingham Canyon objects to the 
municipal severance because such severance will 
result in a loss of tax revenue to the City. 
Not only is the major portion of the Objector's brief de-
voted to a discussion of the loss of tax revenues (see Ob-
jector's brief pp. 8-10), but the only witness produced by 
the Objector at trial, Mayor Peter C. Dimas, admitted that 
the loss of tax revenues together with certain ephemeral, 
"psychological effects" were the primary reasons for the 
City's resistance to the petition to disconnect (R. 96-97). 
In point of fact, however, the cries of poverty heard 
from the City of Bingham Canyon are simply not supported 
by tlw evidence. Mayor Dimas testified that, prior to the 
clisconuection, the revenue to the City of Bingham Canyon 
from sales and use tax for the year of 1964 was approxi-
mately $28,000.00 (R. 83). It is undisputed that the vast 
proportion of these sales and use tax revenues, which after 
disconnection will be paid to the County, derive from Ken-
necott's operations at the mine (R. 83). Because of this 
extraordinary sales and use tax income, which amounts to 
about $2,000.00 per property owner per year within the 
City of Bingham, the City, unlike most other cities and 
counties within the State of Utah, has had no need this 
year to exact a general property tax. And, by virtue of the 
excessive tax revenues enjoyed by the citizens of Bingham 
Canyon, the City has been able to accrue a surplus of 
$98,000.00. Given the rapidly dwindling population, the 
disconnection of 90% of the City's property, and even a 
minimal general property tax levy, the City of Bingham 
Canyon can undoubtedly live out its remaining years in 
relative prosperity on the surplus of $98,000.00, even with-
out sales and use tax revenues. 
Certainly "justice and equity" do not require the situa-
tion which has existed by virtue of which 14 property own-
ers profit because of the fortuitous fact that they are lo-
cated near an important industrial area. "Justice and 
equity" do not insure such property owners the inalienable 
right to be free forever from property taxes. And yet, the 
City (see Objector's Brief, page 9, paragraph 4), claims 
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that the potential necessity of a general property tax is 
unjust and inequitable. To the contrary, it is submitted 
that justice and equity would demand that all property 
owners, including Kennecott, pay a fair share of City ex-
penses through a general property tax. 
Furthermore, the Objector certainly stretches the fact 
when it states (see p. 10 of Objector's Brief) that Kenne-
cott does not want to pay its fair share of expenses. In 
point of fact, Kennecott as an owner of more than 90% 
of the remaining property will remain the largest property 
owner within the restricted city limits, and thus, will pay 
its fair share for municipal services through the general 
property tax. Moreover, in addition to taxes, Kennecott 
will continue to make contributions to the City of Bingham 
Canyon by way of assistance in the maintenance of the 
water system and sewage system. It can hardly be claimed, 
therefore, that Kennecott is abandoning the poor child of 
Bingham City without revenues and without support. To 
the contrary, Kennecott does now and will continue to pay 
a pre-eminently fair share of expenses incurred in the op· 
eration of the city and the provision of its services. 
Moreover, even if it were true that the City would 
suffer the alleged loss of tax revenues because of the muni· 
cipal disconnection, this would not be a sufficient reason 
to deny the disconnection as prayed. It is only obvious that 
any reduction in municipal acreage will ultimately result 
in a loss to the city of property tax revenues. If such a loss 
of tax revenues were a sufficient reason to preclude sever· 
ance, there would never be a severance granted. Apparent· 
11 
ly sen;;;ing this situation, the Supreme Court of Utah has 
repeatedly held that the deprivation of tax revenues is an 
insufficient reason to preclude municipal severance. Thus, 
in Applicat,ion of Peterson, 92 Utah 212, 216, 66 P. 2d 1195 
(1937), this court stated: 
"So, also, the mere fact that the town would 
lose the income derived from the segregated lands 
is not a suffiicent reason to def eat the action." 
Similarly, in the case of In Re Peterson, 87 Utah 144, 154, 
48 P. 2d 468 ( 1935), the town alleged that the present 
taxes were "barely sufficient" to support the town govern-
ment, but the Court said : 
"The mere fact that the town of Moab would 
lose its income heretofore derived from the taxation 
of the lands in question does not justify the refusal 
of petitioner's application to have his land segre-
gated from the town." 
A fortiori, where the City of Bingham Canyon has a fat 
surplus which, together with normal property taxes, can 
support the City easily for its forseeable future, the cry 
of poverty is not a sufficient reason to deny disconnection; 
particularly where, as here, the Petitioner will continue to 
be the largest taxpayer in the city even after severance. 
B. There are no direct, substantial, or appreciable 
municipal benefits conferred upon the area to be d'iscon-
nected. 
Another factor relied upon by the Objector in its Brief 
is that the City of Bingham Canyon renders municipal ser-
vices and benefits to the area to be disconnected, and thus, 
12 
justice and equity purportedly require that the petition be 
denied. Again, however, an analysis of the Utah cases, tc. 
gether with the facts of this case, clearly shows this not tu 
be the case. 
By its mere existence, a city tends to create certain 
benefits for property owners in the vicinity as well as the 
public in general, but such benefits are not sufficient, with-
in the contemplation of Utah law, to require the retention 
of such properties within the city's limits. Rather, the 
Supreme Court of Utah has made it entirely clear that the 
benefits must be tangible and specific. This, for example, 
the court has required "direct and appreciable benefits." 
(In Re Fullmer, 33 Utah 43, 46, 92 Pac. 768 (1907)) and 
"substantial, direct and special benefits," (Howard v. 
North Salt Lake, 7 Utah 2d 278, 284, 323 P. 2d 261 
(1958)). See also, In Re Smithfield City, 70 Utah 564, 568, 
262 Pac. 104 (1927) ("direct or appreciable benefit"); In 
Re Chief Consolidated Min. Co., 71 Utah 430, 443, 266 Pac. 
1044 (1928) ("direct and special benefit") (dissenting 
opinion). 
What then are the direct, special, substantial and ap-
preciable benefits conferred by the City upon the area to 
be disconnected? Basically, the following "benefits" are 
alleged by the Objector as being sufficient to preclude sev-
erance: Water, sewer, roads, police protection, fire protec-
tion, and garbage collection. But a closer analysis of the 
facts suggests that these are either: (1) not provided by 
the City at all, or (2) if available, are unnecessary and 
duplicative by virtue of the Petitioner's own facilities. 
13 
ll'atcr and se11.·cr - These benefits are not in fact 
prnvided by the City to the Petitioner. The undisputed 
c,·ide11ce is to the effect that the sewer system is little more 
Uwn a concrete flume into which a natural creek flows. The 
Petitioner, Kennecott Copper Corporation, originally as-
sish·d in the construction of this facility, it has been jointly 
responsible for the maintenance thereof to the present date, 
~we! it will continue this service in the future (R. 64). 
Clc::trly, this is no more a service furnished by the City to 
the Petitioner than it is a service furnished by the Peti-
! i<>ner to the City. In no event can this be properly de-
scribed as an appreciable, special or direct benefit accorded 
b,1· the City to the property to be disconnected. 
Much the same thing is true with regard to the water 
system. The City and the Petitioner have a joint agree-
ment with respect to culinary water by virtue of which 
Petitioner provides water to the City. Again, there has 
been a joint responsibility for the maintenance of the sys-
tem (R. 57), and it clearly cannot be said, as a net propo-
sition, that the City furnishes an appreciable or special 
benefit to the property in this regard. Moreover, the evi-
dence shows that, if need be, the Petitioner could supply 
its own water with facility (R. 57). 
Roads - The Objector has continually stressed the 
significance of the fact that tourists and workers traveling 
tn the mine must use the Bingham City road. Thus, the 
ar~~·11ment goes, since the City maintains the road, it is un-
iust and inequitable for the Petitioner to disconnect part 
of its property from the City limits. That this is a non-
14 
sequitur is aptly demonstrated by the fact that tourists and 
workers traveling to the mine must also drive through 
Copperton, Magna, Lark, and Salt Lake City to reach their 
destination. Demonstrably, all of these cities should, under 
Objector's theory, have an equal opportunity to include the 
mine within their boundaries. 
Moreover, it has not been suggested that City road 
maintenance will continue in the area to be disconnected 
' 
and thus this is not a service which is relevant in determin. 
ing the propriety of severance. 
Less than two miles of road will remain within the 
City after disconnection. The obligation to maintain this 
road is one owed to the public in general and is not a suffi. 
cient ground to deny disconnection. This court has ex-
pressly so held in another case, In Re Chief Consolidated 
Mining Co., 71 Utah 430, 266 Pac. 1044 (1928) wherein 
the Court stated : 
"The main road running through the inhabited 
area was constructed, and is kept in repair, by the 
City, and there is also some testimony that the road 
leading from the inhabited portion of Mammoth 
City to one of the areas designated 3 was, to a lim· 
ited extent, kept in repair by the municipality." 
After noting such "benefits" existed along with others, 
the Court concluded: 
"The undisputed testimony respecting the 
municipal benefits by way of municipal improve· 
ments such as above enumerated and as found by 
the Court on any of the areas are not alone suf fi-
cient, in our judgment to deny the Petitioners their 
16 
claim for severance of the area from the boundar-
ies of the municipality." 
Police and Fire Protection - As an initial proposition, 
these municipal services are rendered only on a de minimus 
basis. The "police protection" consists of a patrolman who 
performs essentially a traffic control function within the 
inhabited portion of the City. The fire protection consists 
of a volunteer department, which renders much of its per-
formance outside of the city boundaries (R. 91) and which, 
measuring effectiveness by fire losses incurred, has not 
been markedly successful (R. 93). The case of In Re Chief 
Consolidated Mining Co., supra., is again pertinent inas-
much as the Court, after noting the existence of a similar 
fire protection service, concluded that it and other analo-
gously indirect benefits "are not alone sufficient, in our 
judgment, to deny the petitioner's their claim for severance 
of the area from the boundaries of the municipality." 
Moreover, the Petitioner does not need or desire police 
and fire protection on the area to be disconnected inasmuch 
as it has its own facilities for these needs. Again, the 
Utah authority on the matter indicates that the owners of 
uninhabited property, seeking severance from a municipal-
ity, have the right to refuse available city services if they 
prefer to provide for themselves. In two Utah cases, Peti-
tioners could have made use of city water, but found it 
more convenient to obtain it elsewhere. In both instances, 
this Com't granted severance presumably on the theory 
that available services, which are not required or desired, 
are not sufficient to render severance unjust or inequitable. 
Howard v. Town of North Salt Lake, 7 Utah 2d 278, 323 P. 
16 
2d 261, (1958); Application of Peterson, 92 Utah 212, 6fi 
P. 2d 1195 (1937). The same duplication exists with 10_ 
gard to garbage collection (R. 16). 
In summary, therefore, it would appear that the ser-
vices provided by the City to the disconnected area are far 
short of meeting the descriptions of substantial, special, 
direct or appreciable. For the most part, they are services 
which merely redound to the benefit of the public in general 
and which have no direct or special application to the sub-
ject property. Clearly Petitioner's property is not benefited 
appreciably by being included within the City limits of 
Bingham Canyon. Therefore, it is submitted that justice 
and equity, as defined in the Utah cases, would demand 
severance. See, e.g., Howard v. North Salt Lake, 7 Utah 
2d 278, 323 P. 2d 261, (1958). 
C. There is not such a connective and interdependent 
rel,ationship between Bingham City and the area to be dis-
connected as would, in justice and equity, dictate their per-
petual unity. 
Objector has cited and relied upon the Utah case of In 
Re Chief Consolidated Mining Company, 71 Utah 430, 266 
Pac. 1044 ( 1928). While there are some superficial simi-
larities between that case and the instant one, it is clearly 
distinguishable on the facts, so far as it holds that discon-
nection should not be granted. That case involved a petition 
by the mining company to disconnect its properties from 
the small mining town of Mammoth City. With regard to 
municipal benefits and improvements, the evidence was 
similar to that involved in the instant case in that there 
--
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1
e1·,J 110 :;;ubstantial benefits, and the court ultimately con-
('luded the benefits were insufficient to deny the Petition-
,,i'·:, daim for severance (71 Utah at 434). However, the 
nwjority in that decision found a different type of benefit 
extended b.v the City to the mining company - it provided 
the only convenient residence for mine workers. Thus, the 
court noted: 
"It quite definitely appears that a large percent 
of the men residing in Mammoth City are employees 
of the mines located within the boundaries of such 
city. The fact that the workmen needed to carry on 
tile mining operations have a place to reside near 
the mines could not be otherwise than a direct bene-, 
fit to the 1nine owners." · 
In the court's view, the relationship between the mine 
owners and the city was of a symbiotic nature - i.e. but 
for the city, the mines could not operate by virtue of a lack 
of workers, and, conversely, but for the mine the city would 
have no reason to exist. Thus, the court concluded: 
"Mammoth City, as the testimony shows, has 
a population of approximately 1,000 people. The 
interests of the mining companies or rather the 
mines operated \vithin the municipality, are so 
closely related and dependent upon the labor thus 
gathered together that they ought not and cannot 
in equity and justice, disclaim any interest in sup-
porting these necessary conveniences." 
Thus, having found that the mine owners had an obli-
gation to help support the city, the court reversed the trial 
court and denied severance of 3 parcels, and granted sever-
ance of 1. Justices Cherry and Hansen dissented arguing 
18 
that all of the parcels should have been severed as prayed. 
It is submitted that the Mammoth City decision is clearly 
distinguishable from and clearly not controlling in the in-
stant case on the following grounds : 
( 1) There is no evidence whatsoever in the in-
stant case that there is an interdependent relationship 
between the petitioners and the City of Bingham Can-
yon. Nor is there any evidence that the City of Bing-
ham Canyon offers any benefit to the mine by virtue 
of being a residential area for its laborers. To the 
contrary, of some 2500 mine workers, only seven are 
presently residing in the city of Bingham. Certainly, 
it cannot therefore be claimed that the mine depends 
upon Bingham as a labor source. 
(2) There is no evidence in the instant case that 
after disconnection, the petitioners will discontinue 
their contributions to and support of the City of Bing-
ham Canyon. The evidence shows that Kennecott Cop-
per Corporation, after disconnection, will own approxi-
mately 90% of the real property within the restricted 
limits of Bingham City. As a major property owner, 
Kennecott will be called upon to contribute substan· 
tially to support the services offered by Bingham. 
Moreover, by virtue of joint agreements between Ken-
necott and Bingham, the former will continue to sup· 
ply maintenance and assistance with regard to the 
sewer system and the water system which serve the 
City of Bingham Canyon. Therefore, the petitioners 
19 
here do not, in the words of the Court, "disclaim any 
interest in supporting these necessary conveniences." 
(3) It is clear that the holding in the Mammoth 
City case rests upon the theory that severance should 
be denied, given a dependent relationship, where sev-
erance would result in a loss of tax revenue to the city. 
If this be the case, it is submitted that the case has 
been overruled by two subsequent cases which have 
dearly held that the loss of tax revenues is insuffi-
cient, in justice and equity, as a basis for denying 
severance. Application of Peterson, 92 Utah 212, 66 
P. 2d 1195 (1937); In re Peterson, 87 Utah 144, 48 P. 
2d 468 (1935). 
( 4) Finally, it is submitted that the recent case 
of Howard v. North Salt Lake, 7 Utah 2d 278, 323 P. 
2d 261 ( 1958) is more closely in point. In that case, 
the court noted that only two employees of 229 em-
ployed in an industry in the disconnected area lived 
in the town itself. Impliedly, the Court concluded that 
this was hardly sufficient to create a Mammoth City-
like symbiotic relationship. A fortiori, when only 
seven employees of some 2500 are residents of Bing-
ham, the symbiotic relationship does not exist and 
severance should therefore be granted. 
Since, sans the interdependency found in the Mammoth 
City case, said case is factually quite similar to the instant 
case, it is submitted that that case can be cited in favor of 
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severance in the instant case, since there, as here, the bene-
fits were insufficient, alone, to preclude severance. 
D. The totality of facts here involved, in justice and 
equity, dictate severance of the subject property. 
In order to attain a workable application of the con-
cepts of "justice and equity" in municipal severance cases 
' 
it is imperative that the nature and function of a municipal 
corporation should be analyzed. It seems beyond dispute 
that the major function of cities is to provide a local gov-
ernment to administer and provide services to a population 
center. It seems also clear that some density of residential 
population is necessary to make the existence of a munici-
pal corporation efficient or necessary. Thus, for example, 
in order to incorporate a city or town, there must be a 
petition by at least 100 real property taxpayers within the 
proposed city limits. Utah Code Ann. Section 10-2-1 (Rep. 
Vol. 1962). It is interesting to note, in passing, that there 
are only 15 property owners within the original boundaries 
of Bingham City, and thus, were this an incorporation pro· 
ceeding, rather than one for disconnection, a municipal 
government could not even be created. The unsuitability of 
including uninhabited, nonresidential properties within city 
limits has also been recognized by this Court in its deci· 
sions, which, without notable exception, have allowed sev· 
erance where the property involved was uninhabited and 
received no appreciable municipal benefits. See e.g. How· 
ard v. North Salt Lake, 7 Utah 2d 278, 328 P. 2d 261 
(1958); In Re Peterson, 87 Utah 144, 48 P. 2d 468 (1935); 
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Christensen v. Town of Clearfield, 66 Utah 455, 243 Pac. 
367 (1926). And, as stated by the Supreme Court of Iowa, 
in McKeon v. Council Bluffs, 221 N. W. 351, (Iowa 1928): 
"The purpose of municipal incorporation is to 
furnish local self government and cooperative ser-
vice. The needs of the municipality and the benefits 
to the property and residents thereon are the sole 
justification for inclusion of land within municipal 
limits." 
Since the land herein involved is wholly uninhabited, 
is not needed for the future growth or development of Bing-
ham City, does not receive appreciable municipal benefits, 
and is not needed by the municipality, justice and equity 
would seem to require its severance. The words of Justice 
Hansen, dissenting in part in the case of In re Chief Con-
solidated Mining Co., are appropriate: 
"When property owners seek to have their 
property disconnected from a city, under our laws, 
or laws similar thereto, inquiry in the adjudicated 
cases is directed toward the results based upon a 
determination of these propositions: Does the prop-
erty sought to be excluded from the city receive any 
direct and special benefit resulting from the exer-
cise of the powers granted to the city? Is it prob-
able that the future growth and expansion of the 
city will require the territory sought to be discon-
nected? Is the property sought to be disconnected 
necessary for the use of the city? If the answers 
to these three propositions are all in the negative, 
it is quite generally, if not uniformly, held, and 
properly so, that equity and justice require that the 
request of the property owners be granted and the 
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property disconnected from the city." (71 Utah 
430, 440, 266 Pac. 1044 (1928) ) . 
Nor can the Court, in its consideration of justice and 
equity, ignore the obvious public interests involved in this 
case. The present boundaries of Bingham City, which 
stretch far outside the inhabited section thereof (see Ex. 
P-2), have resulted in the creation of substantial obstacles 
to the industrial development of the area involved. Mining 
operations may not be carried on with facility by virtue of 
zoning ordinances, construction permits, and other diffi. 
culties which arise from the inclusion of this area within 
the city limits. It seems questionable, that justice an<l 
equity would require the frustration of an important com-
mercial and industrial development within the State of 
Utah for the sake of 14 property owners. 
Nor should this court ignore the public interest in the 
use and sales taxes presently created by the Kennecott min-
ing complex. As things presently stand, the City of Bing-
ham Canyon receives a large amount of these taxes - some 
$28,000.00 this year. It would seem more logical and more 
conducive to public well-being that this revenue be dis-
tributed throughout the county, which county contributes 
numerous conveniences and necessities to the mining com-
plex. 
Finally, it should be noted that this is not a case 
where the Petitioners are seeking to avoid their responsi-
bilities to financially support Bingham City. As noted by 
the Objector, in its brief, the taxes of Kennecott Copper 
Corporation would not decrease by virtue of this disconnec-
23 
tion, there being at present no property tax within the 
dt:c As a matter of fact, since after disconnection a gen-
eral property tax will probably be levied within the remain-
ing- city limits, Kennecott may incur an increase in tax 
obligations by virtue of the disconnection. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, therefore, it is submitted that justice and 
Pquity require the severance of the subject property from 
the city limits of the City of Bingham Canyon, Utah, for 
the following reasons: 
( 1) The subject property is not suitable for habita-
tion 01· residential use, and thus is not the type of property 
\d1ich normally belongs in a city, it being remote from the 
City and not required for its future growth and develop-
ment. 
(2) The Petitioners will continue to financially sup-
p(lrt the City 0f Bingham Canyon through property taxes 
anct through contributions to the maintenance of the sewer 
~rncl water systems. 
( 3) The disconnection will allow the progression of 
industrial and mining usage of the property to the ultimate 
betterment of the public in general. 
( 
11) The city renders no substantial, appreciable, di-
rect or special benefits to the area sought to be discon-
nected. 
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( 5) The public in general, rather than 7 4 members 
thereof, should enjoy the tax revenues from the mining 
operation herein involved. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PARSONS, BERLE, EVANS 
& LATIMER, 
By Elliott W. Evans and 
Gordon L. Roberts, 
Attorneys for 
Petitioner-Respondent, 
Kennecott Copper Corporation. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, 
CORNWALL & McCARTHY, 
Attorneys for 
Petitioner-Respondent, 
The Anaconda Company. 
